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Abstract: Modernity is increasingly about movement, with people navigating through 
different spaces and places throughout their lives and careers. Probably all the more 
so when we deal with islanders, who combine home and away in strategic ways: for 
adventure, education, work, career development. Islanders are not insular.
 This paper offers a contrast between the dominant narratives of mobility and 
immobility of the 21st century. At one end, there is the ‘kinetic elite’ which includes 
professionals who commute regularly between countries as part of their work and 
career development: university academics, corporate managers, software technicians, 
European Commission staff. Along with these is a select but growing number of HNWIs – 
high net worth individuals – those who exploit multiple residence and citizenship schemes 
(and various tax code loopholes) to park themselves, and their assets, temporarily in 
particular jurisdictions. Often with multiple passports, these persons face sophisticated 
marketeers and promoters keen to enlist them to their schemes. At the other end are 
the millions vying for a better life or seeking to escape famine, drought, civil war, and 
political persecution, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Often with no 
passports, these face multiple barriers to manage their movements. In between these 
two solitudes, are the lives and stories of the islanders themselves who may need to 
reconcile themselves with, but often disregard, these contradictory policies.
 Islands (and islanders and their governments) face these contradictory pressures 
and often label and stereotype the subjects of these divergent mobility patterns in 
dramatically different ways. These labels are often corroborated by equally stereotypical 
notions of race, ethnicity, and religion. The paper fleshes out these ideas by reflecting 
largely on three parallel mobility narratives on two Mediterranean islands: Malta and 
Lesvos (Greece).
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The Scenario
Today, geography still matters; but it matters in a different way. The notions of distance, space, place, and time need to be radically reviewed and reconfigured in the context of the twenty-
first century. Globalization has eased the navigation of products, 
services, money, and people across the planet.1 Developments in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) have shrunk 
(or even ‘killed’) distance and offer a new sense of immediacy and 
intimacy.2 Neo-liberalism has supported these technical and economic 
initiatives with its own political thrust and agenda.3 
The old ‘space-time’ dichotomies may appear thoroughly erased, 
and certainly problematized differently, for those who can afford 
regular physical visit-journeys that criss-cross boundaries, along with 
the modern-day electronic virtual communication paraphernahlia of 
mobile phone, e-mail, whatsapp, web-cams, blogs, digital photography, 
and video streaming.4 
The real costs associated with physical mobility have fallen 
sharply – consider mobile telephony, text messaging, and low-cost 
airline tickets – making people’s engagement and commitment to 
tasks underway in a number of diverse physical locations increasingly 
possible and attractive. The willingness and ability to travel is not just 
commonplace but increasingly expected: having and using a passport 
is a normal rather than an exceptional feature of various occupational 
contracts. The functional-spatial-temporal flexibility of knowledge-
capital (as with any other factor of production) is required, to the extent 
that mobility (including multiple language) skills are sought after and 
recognized. Barriers of ethnicity, nationhood, and race have become 
more fluid in drives for specialist recruitment, just as much as barriers 
of occupational demarcation, trade, employer loyalty, or standard 
1 W.E. Murray and J. Overton, Geographies of Globalisation (London, 2014). 
2 K. ohmae, the End of the nation-State: the Rise of Regional Economies (New York, 1995); 
F. Cairncross, the Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution will Change our 
lives (Cambridge MA, 1997); E. Tranos and P. Nijkamp, ‘The death of distance revisited: 
Cyber‐place, physical and relational proximities’, Journal of Regional Science, 53, (2013), 
855–73.
3 D. Harvey, a Brief History of neoliberalism (Oxford, 2007).
4 R. Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims to challengers’, international af-
fairs, 72 (1996), 507–20.
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working time have been steadily melting away in the face of flexible 
specialization, workforce professionalization, self-employment, tele-
working, Skyping, and the decline of traditional and protectonist trade 
unions. The long and short of all this is that it can no longer be assumed 
that people are physically available in a certain [read specific] place for 
a certain [read long and regular] time.
And yet, some would say that this techno-liberal push, as much 
as the nature and impact of globalization, which reached a climax 
in the Single European Act (signed in 1985) and the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, has been greatly exaggerated.5 Moreover, 
this push may have been simply too successful and lethal in its 
far-reaching consequences.6 We are now witnessing a backlash 
of and by States, governments, and populist political agendas, 
trying to reclaim some lost ground and recover or ringfence 
control over ‘market forces’ and domestic policy-making that 
have progressively eroded the influence of states on people in 
place. Consider the collapse of the Doha round of World Trade 
Organisation talks already back in 2009, the Trump phenomenon 
in the US, the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK, the temporary 
suspension of visa-free travel within the Schengen zone, and the 
attitudes of the Orban government in Hungary and the Law and 
Justice Party government in Poland with respect to the EU.7 Race, 
nation, security, and identity are once again toxic topics in domestic 
politics. Physical borders have been on the rise as peoples have 
been seeking to better protect their own turf.
5 D. Harvey, ‘Neo‐Liberalism as creative destruction’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography, 88 (2006), 145–58.
6 W. Streeck and P.C. Schmttter, ‘From national corporatism to transnational pluralism: or-
ganised interests in the Single European Market’, politics & Society, 19 (1991), 133–64. 
7 A. Ong, neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham NC, 
2006); S.C. Schwab, ‘After Doha: why the negotiations are doomed and what we should do 
about it’, Foreign affairs, May/June, 2011, 104–17; E. Farrelly, ‘Brexit and Trump, neolib-
eralism has reached its natural conclusion. What now’, the age, 13 August 2016; available 
from http://www.theage.com.au/comment/in-brexit-and-trump-neoliberalism-has-reached-
its-natural-conclusion-what-now-20160811-gqq012; R. Brubaker, ‘Between nationalism 
and Civilisationism: The European populist moment in comparative perspective’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 40  (2017), 1191–226; European Commission, Temporary reintroduc-
tion of border control (Brussels, 2017); available from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en 
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Have mobility skills, will travel
In this turbulent context, those most likely to conform to the description 
of a mobile class would be ‘professional knowledge workers’: freelance 
consultants, senior financial service executives, academics, and senior 
corporate managers. These are the cadres on which airline companies 
have reaped considerable profits from the sale of first-class and 
business class tickets and access to airport lounges. However, there 
are two additional, and very dissimilar, clusters of persons who are 
also identifiable by their willingness to travel in the modern age. One 
group consists in HNWI, or ‘high net worth individuals’:8 these are the 
super rich, usually accompanied by family members, with considerable 
financial assets and who are most likely to shop around for the best 
places to live, park their money, practise their favourite sport, educate 
their children, and entertain their friends.9 The second group consists of 
refugees, economic migrants, and asylum-seekers: individuals, usually 
accompanied by family members, fleeing civil wars, famine, drougths, 
unemployment and religious and/or political persecution, in search of a 
better, safer life.10
While similarly disposed towards mobility, these two groupings 
are very different from each other. Rather than focusing on just their 
qualities and behaviour, I wish to turn our sights in this paper to the 
ways in which States respond to the challenges, opportunities, and 
threats posed by the movements, actual and intended, of these two 
groups. The discrepancy and contrast in state practice speaks volumes 
about the absence of morality in mobility and about the readiness of 
and by governments to discriminate amongst the mobile, largely on the 
basis of the depth of their pockets.
Mobility poses an obvious challenge to the modern State whose 
authority and raison d’etre is premised on the notion of territoriality.11 A 
government seeks to exercise legitimate control over a citizenry – and 
will lay claim to a portion of its revenue via taxation – not so much via 
8 I. Hay (ed.). Geographies of the Super-rich (Cheltenham, 2013).
9 M. Featherstone, ‘Super-rich lifestyles’, in T. Birtchnell and J. Caletrío (eds.), Elite Mobili-
ties (London, 2014), 99–135.
10 M.J. Gibney, the Ethics and politics of asylum: liberal Democracy and the Response to 
Refugees (Cambridge, 2004).
11 S. Elden, the Birth of territory (Chicago, 2013).
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notions of birth and blood affinity, but by virtue of residence. Only two 
countries in the world charge tax on the global world income of their 
non-resident citizens: Eritrea and the United States.12 Most ongoing 
public policy continues to assumes a fixity of address: education policy, 
economic policy, labour policy, taxation policy, proprietary rights … all 
assume that individuals have, or should have, one home, somewhere. 
And the enforcement of domicile – including via the closure of borders 
to the unqualifed – is seen as part of the mandate of the state; a mandate 
that has become a priority with the rise of securitization in the West.
Enter islands
Let me now bring ‘small islands’ into the discussion. Their self-
evident delineated boundaries help to increase the disposition towards 
a proto-ethnic sense of self amongst the locals;13 they also transform 
immigration control to the function of policing the coast (apart from any 
access points offered by airports and sea ports), with no land border to 
watch over.14 However, one often forgets that most islands are anything 
but insular:15 they have a natural and inevitable orientation towards 
openness and thrive on trade and commerce; their island inhabitants look 
to their respective metropole for inspiration, adventure, entertainment, 
shopping, education, and/or employment. Island literature is dominated 
by the migration theme.16 Indeed, exile (or ex-isle),17 is often the only 
effective antidote to a pervasive and stifling totality, monopoly, and 
12 T. Durden, ‘An appalling practice used in only two nations, of which the US is one’, Zero 
Hedge, 17 September 2014; available from http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-09-17/
appalling-practice-used-only-two-nations-which-us-one?page=1.
13 G. Baldacchino, ‘Islands: objects of representation’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography, 87 (2005), 247–51.
14 Id., ‘Islands and the offshoring possibilities and strategies of contemporary states: insights 
on/for the migration phenomenon on Europe’s southern flank’, island Studies Journal, 9 
(2014), 57–68.
15 C. Gosden and C. Pavlides, ‘Are islands insular? Landscape versus seascape in the case of 
the Arawe Islands, Papua New Guinea’, archaeology in oceania, 1 (1994), 162–71.
16 For example, E.A. Markham (ed.), Hinterland: Caribbean poetry from the West indies and 
Britain (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1989); R. King and J. Connell, Small Worlds, Global Lives: 
Small islands and Migration (London, 1999).
17 C. Bongie, islands and Exiles: the Creole identities of post/colonial literature (Staford 
CA, 1998).
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intimacy of the local socio-cultural-political environment.18 Islanders 
are well-known to have a higher propensity to migrate to developed 
countries:19 international migration has, in fact, long been recognized 
as heaviest from the world’s smallest territories, to the extent that 
there are, say, more Cook Island citizens living in New Zealand than 
in the Cook Islands themselves.20 For various small-island households, 
migration is a powerful strategic resource, since children sent to live 
abroad can be expected to infuse remittances, in cash or in kind, to the 
home economy: in some instances (such as Samoa and Tonga), these 
are significant contributions to the gross national product.21
The life-histories of small islanders, where meticulously 
documented, reveal a complex juggling of the pros and cons of staying 
at home and going overseas. They constitute living examples of what 
are called ‘transnationals’, a specific pattern of de-territorialized 
and cross-boundary migration that challenges the concept of the 
temporality and spatiality of ‘homeness’.22 A series of human 
resource retention, development, or reclamation strategies have been 
and are being developed by enterprising individuals or families in 
order to nurture and exploit the advantages of a glocal citizenship.23 
Government policy has much to catch up with, and, in many cases, 
turns a blind eye and refuses to consider that individuals are behaving 
in these trans-territorial ways that lead to selective spatial and 
residential shopping. Moreover, they are also doing so in ways that 
do not necessarily translate as single and definitive acts of emigration 
from A and immigration into B. Rather, ‘circular migration’ is 
18 G. Baldacchino, Global tourism and informal labour Relations: the Small Scale Syndrome 
at Work (London, 1997).
19 J. Connell and R. King, ‘Island migration in a changing world’, in R. King & J. Connell 
(eds.) Small Worlds, 1–26.
20 Baldacchino, Global tourism, 89; D. Lowenthal, ‘Social issues’, in C.G. Clarke & T. Payne 
(eds.), Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London, 1987), 41–3.
21 A. Ahlburg and R.P.C. Brown, ‘Migrants’ intentions to return home and capital transfers: a 
study of Tongans and Western Samoans in Australia’, Journal of Development Studies, 35 
(1998), 125–51.
22 D.T. Duval, ‘Conceptualising return visits: a transnational perspective’ in T. Coles and D. 
Timothy (eds.), Tourism, Diasporas and Space: Travels to Promised Lands (London, 2004), 
50–61; P. Hatziprokopiou, ‘Balkan immigrants in the Greek city of Thessaloniki’, European 
Urban and Regional Studies, 11 (2004), 321–38; S. Vertovec, ‘Transnationalism and Iden-
tity’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27 (2001), 573–82.
23 T.J. Courchene, ‘Glocalisation: the regional/international interface’, Canadian Journal of 
Regional Science, 18 (1995), 1–20.
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increasingly common, facilitated by the increasing disposition to, and 
ease of, doing so.24
Place-based public policy will find it hard to manage, let alone 
contain, these practices. The allegiance of citizens or organizations to 
single countries has been dented with the emergence of trans-national 
corporations, multi-passporting, ‘circular migration’ strategies, and 
a glocal elite with dual or multiple nationalities. Firms have been 
exploiting different tax regimes to park funds and profits where they are 
safe yet are likely to be taxed least. High net worth individuals now do 
the same, arguing that, while tax avoidance is a crime, tax minimization 
is not.25 Investment migration, understood as the acquisition of legal 
residence and eventually citizenship in exchange for a donation or 
investment into the economy of the jurisdiction concerned, is now 
a strategy practised by individuals – directly and/or through their 
companies – as much as by those governments keen on luring them 
for their financial assets, talent, and/or simply brand power26. Some 
50 countries today allow dual citizenship.27 These include various EU 
member states: Malta introduced a citizenship by investment scheme in 
2014, following local domestic controversy;28 while Greece introduced 
a residency by investment scheme in 2013, but is changing this to a 
citizenship by investment scheme ‘compatible with those of Cyprus 
and Malta’.29
Here, I turn to two Mediterranean island cases where I can admit 
some familiarity and where I wish to critique mobility policy in practice 
24 G.J. Abel and N. Sander, ‘Quantifying global international migration flows’, Science, 343 
(2014), 1520–2.
25 P. Alldridge, ‘Tax avoidance, tax evasion, money laundering and the problem of “offshore”’, 
in P. Lagunes (ed.) Greed, Corruption and the Modern State (Cheltenham, 2015), 317–35.
26 O. Parker, ‘Commercialising citizenship in Crisis EU: The case of immigrant investor pro-
grammes’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 55 (2017), 332–48; K. Surak, ‘Global Citi-
zenship 2.0: The Growth of Citizenship by Investment Programmes’, Occasional Paper. In-
vestment Migration Council, 2016, Available at http://investmentmigration.org/download/
global-citizenship-2-0-growth-citizenship-investment-programs/. 
27 A. Henderson, ‘Which countries allow dual citizenship and which don’t?’, nomad Capi-
talist, 2014; available from http://nomadcapitalist.com/2014/04/25/countries-allow-dual-
citizenship/.
28 G. Baldacchino, ‘Malta Transformed by Multi-Level Governance: More Than Just an Out-
come of Europeanisation’, occasional papers Series, 3 (2014), Institute of European Stud-
ies, University of Malta.
29 ‘2nd Passports.com, Greece: Citizenship by Investment’, 2017; available 
from‘https://2ndpassports.com/greece-citizenship-by-investment/’. 
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and to question its morality. The first is Malta (resident population: 
420,000), a sovereign archipelagic state that straddles the passage from 
Libya to Italy being followed by many undocumented migrants.30 It has 
a contemporary labour market with a large and still growing number 
of immigrant workers (around 30,000), while some 3,000 Maltese 
work with the European Commission and in other EU member states, 
benefiting from the bloc’s freedom of movement. Lesvos (population: 
86,000), meanwhile, is a Greek island located just six kilometres away 
from the Turkish mainland and the transit point of up to a million 
immigrants that have entered the EU in recent years.31 It is also the new 
home of some expatriates who have applied for Greek residence (and 
eventual citizenship after seven years) and is increasingly tolerant of 
Turkish tourists and investors to boost the local island economy, which 
is still recovering from the effects of a major financial crisis.
A triple mobility narrative
Thus, there unfolds on these islands a triple mobility narrative. The first 
concerns local citizens, who are keen travellers. With only Gozo as the 
local hinterland, the Maltese gravitate internationally, where practically 
every trip involves a flight out of the country; the citizens of Lesvos travel 
to mainland Greece, often by ferry, but also to Turkey, a short hop away, 
and elsewhere, though not so much to other Greek islands. Here, mobility 
is extensive and unrestricted, particularly within the Schengen zone, 
of which both Malta and Greece are members. Being members of the 
20-country euro-zone avoids the inconvenience of currency conversion; 
however, the citizens of Greece have had to tolerate capital controls for 
some time, restricting the amount of foreign currency they could purchase.
The second narrative relates to undocumented migrants. Pending 
those who have drowned in the perilous sea journey, these have been 
arriving by boat and dinghy from Turkey to Lesvos; or saved at sea by 
the Maltese coast guard (but now increasingly landing as ‘tourists’ at 
30 D. Lutterbeck, ‘Small frontier island: Malta and the challenge of irregular immigra-
tion’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 20 (2009), 119–44.
31 A. Afouxenidis, M. Petrou, G. Kandylis, A. Tramountanis, and D. Giannaki, ‘Dealing with a 
humanitarian crisis: Refugees on the eastern EU border of the island of Lesvos’, Journal of 
applied Security Research, 12 (2007), 7–39.
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the Malta International Airport and then overstaying their tourist visa). 
These are subjected to mobility restrictions: locked in detention centres 
– Safi Barracks and Lyster Barracks in Malta (until 2015) and Moria in 
Lesvos, their movement reduced or curtailed, while refugee status claims 
are processed. Such spaces are transitional spaces where inmates are 
often treated like criminals and human rights are progressively eroded in 
the world of modern biopolitics.32 They are eventually moved to ‘open 
centres’ or repatriated back home, often against their will. Many will 
continue their journey: the island was always meant as a transit point. 
Often with the connivance of the locals, they head out of Malta and to 
Continental Europe via Sicily and Italy, or out of Lesvos via ferry to 
Athens or Thessaloniki and then onwards to the continental heartlands 
of Germany, France, Sweden. Throughout, these immigrants are 
treated as illegal personas – klandestini, in Maltese, mετανάστες χωρίς 
έγγραφα in Greek – and held under harsh and demeaning conditions. 
They are deemed burdens on the State, even though many would 
work, and work hard, if and when given the opportunity. Processing 
asylum claims may take many months; at one point it took 18 months 
in Malta: a measure, many locals agreed, that would help dissuade still 
more migrants from considering coming over there. To a segment of 
the local population, the ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds of 
most immigrants – many are dark-skinned Muslims from sub-Saharan 
Africa – raises imagined notions of their own Christian, European, and 
‘white-skinned’ credentials and identities.33 (By the way, the sun-baked 
Maltese and Greeks are hardly white-skinned: sorry.) The long history 
of the Mediterranean as a polyglot region and a tolerant churn of peoples 
united by the desire to trade has, alas, been conveniently forgotten.34
The third narrative relates to those applying for what will eventually 
be an attractive dual passport which grants visa free access to all EU 
countries (and in the case of Malta, as a Commonwealth member state, 
access to even more countries, and including the UK, even if and when 
32 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and Bare life, (Stanford CA, 1998); Lesvos 
Legal Centre, ‘Moria Community Leaders Demand Respect for Refugee Rights in Lesvos’ 
10 January 2017; available from https://legalcentrelesbos.wordpress.com/
33 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London, 2006); G. Baldacchino, ‘Pangs of nascent nationalism from the nationless state? 
Euro coins and undocumented migrants in Malta since 2004’, nations and nationalism, 15 
(2009), 148–65.
34 D. Abulafia, the Great Sea: a Human History of the Mediterranean (Oxford, 2011).
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it leaves the EU). The targets here are high net worth individuals and 
their families, often owning more than €5 million as assets. Here, 
smartly dressed executives engaged with reputable consultancy firms 
(such as Henley and Partners, Knight Frank and Monarch & Co) as 
well as staff at the respective ministries and government agencies, will 
facilitate access and help in the processing of applications, most taking 
just a few months. The mechanisms of the State are deployed to screen 
but then to lubricate the transition towards the acquisition of property, 
corporate investment, and other requirements. Tellingly, the residence 
condition attached to the scheme in Malta has been legally defined to 
mean buying and owning (and not necessarily taking up) residence in 
Malta. After all, while HNWIs are often likely to purchase property 
and make the necessary financial investments to secure their second 
passports, they are just as unlikely to actually take up residence in 
their newly adopted country (other than for short periods). The second 
passport is typically an insurance policy, potentially useful in the longer 
term.
Concluding reflections
Today’s mobility politics are selective, driven by the State’s pursuit 
of talent and investment; as much as by its ambiguity in the face of 
asylum seekers. A machinery of control and processing comes into play 
and accompanies both high-end and low-end considerations: there are 
applications to filled in, interviews to be scheduled, processing times 
to be respected. But the approaches are very different: the treatment of 
one set of clientele verges on that reserved for criminals; the treatment 
of the other set is accompanied by the accoutrements of etiquette and 
civility. 
Disasters demobilize and remobilize individuals.35 Wealth creates 
manifold opportunities for the mobility of persons and personal assets, 
and, while States practise closure and selection at their borders, they 
can also not just accept but even fast-track applicants who meet specific 
endowment criteria, for both residency and citizenship. Mobility 
35 M. Sheller, ‘The islanding effect: post-disaster mobility systems and humanitarian logistics 
in Haiti’, Cultural Geographies, 20 (2013), 185–204.
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justice is troubled by these double standards, where they exist. They 
become all the more glaring when these dissimilar groups of residence-
seekers perchance meet and interact in the same space. The relatively 
small populations and land areas of Malta and Lesvos should facilitate 
such encounters, including those with the locals. However, while the 
identity of refugees and asylum seekers is visibly marked by their 
dress, language, skin colour, and/or physical confinement in detention, 
the identity of the HNWIs is more heterogenous and their location and 
movements on the islands tends to be more discrete. Indeed, so discrete 
that these may be nowhere to be seen.
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